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STUDENT NOTES
Mineral Interests and the Executive Right in
West Virginia
Because the risk and expense incident to the drilling and com-
pletion of an oil and gas well is great, a mineral owner is seldom
able to undertake such an operation himself. In practice, there-
fore, the only way he may benefit from his ownership in the
minerals is by leasing the right to develop them on a royalty
basis.'
In West Virginia, because of the confusion surrounding the
effect and validity of the "executive right!2 and because of the
IUnited Carbon Co. v. Presley, 126 W. Va. 636, 29 S.E.2d 466 (1944).
Of course if the mineral owner is sufficiently affluent he may himself develop
the underlying minerals, but such affluence is seldom encountered in the
average West Virinia mineral owner.
The term 'executive right" is used to designate the right to execute
oil and gas leases on premises affected by a royalty or non-executive interest.
[ 221 1
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strict adherence to the common law rules of waste,3 the lessee is
forced to obtain from all the owners of interests in the oil and
gas the exclusive right to prospect for those minerals which may
underlie a specific tract of land. As one generation succeeds
another, the number of persons necessary to execute the lease
inevitably increases, with the result that the expense of tracing
title to each fractional interest may, by itself, create a serious
deterrent to alienability. Likewise, when various interests have
been carved out of the full mineral interest, doubts may be created
with respect to whether any such interest carries with it a power
to lease. It is readily apparent that if the full mineral interest has
been divided into many small, undivided interests, securing agree-
ment on the terms of the lease from all the interested parties could
be a practical impossibility, thereby preventing development of the
minerals.4 Consequently, if the oil and gas cannot be exploited
because of a strict adherence to the common law rules of waste,
or because of a failure to give effect to the executive right, the
owner of an interest in those minerals has been needlessly deprived
of the beneficial enjoyment he should have had in the minerals.5
Morris, Mineral Interest or Royalty Interest? SotrmvEsTRN LEAL FOUNDA-
TION 10TH INSTITUTE ON OnL & GAS LAW & TAXATION 259 (1959). "The
executive right to lease and the separated exclusive power of one to lease the
lands or a mineral interest of another for oil and gas operations and develop-
ment have the same meaning." Everett, Executive Right to Lease, 3 RocKY
MOuNTAni MImNRAL L. INSTITUTE 509 (1957).3 W. VA. CODE ch. 37, art. 7, § 2 (Michie 1961); Freeman v. Egnor,
72 W. Va. 830, 79 S.E. 824 (1913); DoNLEY, COAL, OIL & GAS IN WEST
Vmon.TrA & VinrN §§ 11-13 (1951).
4See Law v. Heck Oil Co., 106 W. Va. 296, 154 S.E. 601 (1928), where
the owner of a 1/768th mineral interest, who had refused to lease, was per-
mitted to enjoin drilling operations, even though he was being unreasonable
in his demands for a bonus in light of the minute amount of production near
the tract in question. Contra, Garcia v. Sun Oil Co., 200 S.W.2d 724 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957), where the court held that a nonconsenting contenant was
not entitled to an injunction to prevent entry and development, and the cotenant
making the entry to drill for oil and gas was entitled to an injunction to
restrain the nonconsenting cotenant from interfering with such entry.
'2 Ws.LLAMs & MEYms, Orr & GAS LAW § 502 (1959); "No owner of
an interest in property, however great or small, should be able to veto the
development of it by the owner of another interest, and at the same time be
in turn subject to a veto by that other." Olds, Future interests in Oil & Gas,
SovTawEsmN LEGAL FOUNDATION 8TH INSTITUTE ON On. & GAS LAW &
TAXATION 163, 165 (1957). Under the rule which is applied in the majority
of states, a cotenant in the fee may enter to explore for and produce the oil
and gas without the consent of his cotenants. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen,
2 F.2d 566, 40 A.L.R. 1389 (8th Cir. 1924); Stephens v. Click, 287 S.W.2d
630 (Ky. 1955); McIntosh v. Ropp, 233 Pa. 497, 82 AU. 949 (1912). "In
Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and West Virginia, the rights of cotenants to
extract minerals are severly restricted in comparison to the rights of cotenants
[Vol. 66222
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For some time the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that the use of the words "royalty" or "royalty interest" in a
mineral conveyance created an interest in the minerals in place
rather than a royalty interest.6 The reason advanced for such a
construction was the common law dictum known as "Coke's rule' 7
-a grant of the profits of the land is a grant of the land itself. The
adoption of this rule had the apparent consequence of forbidding
the creation of a non-executive interest by influencing the court
to construe instruments as creating a mineral rather than a royalty
or other non-executive interest.' The court in adopting this rule
did not seem to realize that classification of an interest a royalty
or other non-executive interest was desirable because such a classi-
fication avoided a division of the management and leasing powers
into small units and promoted trading in the various interests
without making it difficult to lease the land subject to such
transactions."
Most courts have either expressly rejected Coke's rule or ignored
it.'" In these jurisdictions the non-executive has no right to join
in the execution of an oil and gas lease and there is no need for
in-those states which follow the majority rule." 1 KNTi-z, On. & GAs § 5.4
(1962). Cotenants who commit waste are wrongdoers and may be sued either
jointly or severally. Stewart v. Tennant, 52 W. Va. 559, 44 S.E. 223 (1903).
6 "In a series of cases, beginning with Toothman v. Courtney, 62 W. Va.
167, 58 S.E. 915 (1907), it has been held or recognized that a grant or ...
reservation of the ... royalties to be derived from the land, unlimited in
time, is in legal effect, a grant, or an exception and reservation of title to
the minerals in place." DoNLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 162a. Oklahoma and
Colorado also hold with the minority position and create a mineral interest.
Simson v. Langholf, 133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956); Meeks v. Harmon,
201 Okla. 459, 250 P.2d 203 (1952). Oklahoma has modified its position
somewhat and states that as a rule of construction the term "royalty" is to
be considered in the broad sense of denoting mineral rights when there is
no oil and gas lease on the property, and in the restricted sense denoting an
interest in the production alone when the property is under lease. Elliott v.
Berry, 206 Okla. 594, 245 P.2d 726 (1952); Purcell v. Thaxton, 202 Okla.
612, 216 P.2d 574 (1950); Stanton, Recent Developments in the Construction
of Mineral Estates, Sour wEsT'RN LEGAL FouNDATiON 7TH INsTromTE ON On.
& GAs LAw & TAXATION 301 309 (1956).
t ". . . If a man seized of lands in fee by his deed granteth to another
the profit of those lands, the whole land itselfe doth passe; for what is the
land but the profits thereof. 2CoKE UPON LITrLETON [146.b], V. (2)
(1812).
8 1 WmLLbAss & MzyEaS, Or. & GAs LAV § 304.9 (1959).
9 See Note, Exclusive Power to Lease, 34 TUL. L. Rxv. 375 (1959).
18Tyler v. Baucher, 225 Ark. 806, 285 S.W.2d 524 (1956)-interest
involved was described as a share of the oil "produced and saved." Miller v.
Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 Pac. 140 (1926); Hassie Hunt Trust Co. v. Proctor,
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examining his title. Recognition of the non-executive interests
increases the ease of alienability by enabling small shares of future
bonuses, rentals, or royalties to be transferred without complicating
the mineral title. Operators seeking to purchase leases or examin-
ing title prior to drilling need only to establish that the outstanding
interests are royalty or non-participating mineral interests.
In Davis v. Hardman," by distinguishing the incidents of owner-
ship of a royalty interest from those of a mineral interest and by
relegating Coke's rule to a rule of construction, the validity of a
pure royalty interest was upheld for the first time in West Virginia.
This decision should have a profound effect on mineral transac-
tions in this state. However, before an analysis of the Davis case
can be meaningful, and, particularly, its effect on the validity of
a severance of the executive right from the mineral estate, it will
be necessary to define the interests involved, and to examine their
nature and the typical methods of creating them.
Tii MINERAL INTEREST
By the weight of authority, the term "minerals" normally in-
cludes the oil and gas unless other language in the instrument
restricts the definition of the term as used by the parties so that
it excludes these resources.
12
Oil and gas in West Virginia are susceptible to absolute owner-
ship in place. 3 Therefore, title to these minerals may be transferred
or conveyed in any manner that would be appropriate for a transfer
of title to any other kind of real property. 4 After a severance
of the mineral fee from the ownership of the surface, the mineral
owner may do all that the fee simple absolute owner might have
done.
11 133 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1963). This case will be more fully discussed
and analyzed later.
12 Sut v. Hockstetter Oil Co. 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 307 (1908); For
a collection of cases illustrating the majority view, see generally Annot., 17
A.L.R. 156 (1922); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1440 (1954).
13 Robinson v. Milam, 125 W. Va. 218, 24 S.E.2d 236 (1942); Williamson
v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S.E. 436 (1894). A mineral interest is viewed
as real property. Lockhart v. United Fuel Gas Co., 105 W. Va. 69, 141
S.E. 521 (1928). 61 W. VA. L. REv. 72, 74 (1958), observes that it is
difficult to ascertain whether the Lessees interest under an oil and gas lease
is regarded as real or personal property in West Virginia. See Charter v.
Maxwell, 132 W. Va. 282, 52 S.E.2d 753 (1949); DONLEY, op. cit. supra
note 3, §§ 21-22. Texas views the interest of an oil and gas lessee as a cor-
poreal estate and thus real property. Renwar Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, 154 Tex.
311, 276 S.W.2d 774 (1955); 1 WmLAS & MEYEmS, op. cit. supra note 8,
§ 210.5.14 DoNEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 27.
[Vol. 66
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The full mineral interest represents the total of all interests pos-
sible in the oil and gas and other minerals. Specifically, with
reference to the benefits to be derived from the exploitation of
the minerals, the owner of the full mineral interest has (1) the
right of ingress and egress; (2) the right to drill and develop the
minerals; (3) the right to lease the minerals for development;
and (4) the right to receive bonuses, delay rentals, and royalties."5
When title to the minerals is severed from the fee simple title, it is
not necessary for the conveying instrument to state that any one
or more these various incidents of ownership are conveyed, for
the mineral fee owner will acquire all of the incidents of owner-
ship because they inhere in the very nature of a severed mineral
interest. 6 According to conventional real property terminology,
the right of the mineral fee owner to receive payment of bonuses,
rentals, and royalties, after the granting of a lease, is described
as being incident to his reversionary interest. However, the pattern
of such payments has become standardized to such an extent that
it is common, now, for the courts to treat the right to these pay-
ments as being incident to the full mineral interest, irrespective of
an outstanding lease."
The owner of the mineral fee, in a jurisdiction adopting the
ownership in place theory, 8 may convey to another an undivided
interest in the minerals thereby creating ". . . some form of
cotenancy." 9 The owner of this undivided interest must, by defini-
tion, share proportionally in those rights which are inherent in the
mineral fee. °  This conveyance-the transfer of an undivided
'1 1 WmLmsr_ & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 202.2; Morris, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 264.16W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 12, § 7 (Michie 1961), provides that a deed
conveys all of the grantor's right, title, and interest unless an exception is made
therein. W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 11 (Michie 1961), provides that when
real property is conveyed or devised the whole estate or interest of the testator
or grantor is devised or conveyed unless a contrary intention appears in the
instrument. Boggess v. Milam, 127 W. Va. 654, 34 S.E.2d 257 (1945); Simson
v. Langholf, supra note 6.
17 Cormier v. Ferguson, 92 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1957); Crews v. Burke,
309 P.2d 291 (Okla. 1957); 1 Kum, op. cit. supra note 5, § 15.1.
18 The oil and gas in place is considered real property, and as such subject
to absolute ownership. Kennedy v. Ohio Fuel Oil Co., 84 W. Va. 585, 101
S.E. 159 (1919); Rymer v. South Penn Oil Co., 54 W. Va. 530. 46 S.E. 559
(1904); Doui.s, op. cit. supra note 3, § 3. A severed mineral or royalty in-
terest is generally viewed as incorporeal in those states not adopting the
ownership in place theory. 1 WmLAm & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 209.
19 1 KuNrz, op. cit supra note 5, § 15.2.
o Boggess v. Milam, supra note 16; Simson v. Langholf, supra note 16.
1964]
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interest in the mineral fee-may be made by grant, reservation, or
exception.
Historically, there was an important distinction between an ex-
ception and a reservation. An exception in a deed withheld from
the grantee title to some existing part of the property embraced
by the description which would otherwise pass under the instrument,
with the result that an exception of the minerals or an interest in
those minerals to the grantor retained title to the minerals in the
grantor." A reservation created some new right in the grantor
issuing out of the property conveyed. 2 Technically, at common
law, incorporeal interests might be reserved in a grant and cor-
poreal interests excepted from it. Strict application of the common
law rule might result in a finding that language of "reservation"
is ineffective to sever a mineral interest in a jurisdiction, such
as West Virginia, where such interests are viewed as corporeal
estates. Similarly, language of "exception" could be ineffective to
reserve a mineral interest in a state where such are viewed as
incorporeal estates.23 In modem conveyancing however, both terms
are used in a cumulative fashion and have been described as inter-
changeable.24 Consequently, a mineral interest may now be con-
veyed by either a grant, reservation, or exception.25
The classification of an interest as either a mineral interest, or
as a royalty interest, is important in determining the share of the
21 Silvis v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 386 Pa. 453, 126 A.2d 706 (1956);
DoNLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 29.22A reservation creates some new right in the grantor which is "reserved"
or "regranted" to him. Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W. Va. 272, 71
S.E.2d 65 (1952); See Freeport Coal Co. v. Valley Point Mining Co., 141
W. Va. 397, 126 S.E.2d 296 (1955).
23 1 WnxrAwis & MEYERs, op. cit. supra note 8, § 210.5; See also DoNIEY,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 29 at 34.24 Freeport Coal Co. v. Valley Point Mining Co., supra note 22; Brown v.
Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953); Ewing v. Trawick, 208 Okla.
311, 256 P.2d 182 (1953). The physical location of the clause which purports
to retain some interest in the grantor is no longer important, unless the word"except" is used alone in connection with the warranty clause instead of the
word "reserved" in which case the exception may be construed to operate
only as an exception to the covenant of warranty and not to the granting
clause. Rose v. Cook, 207 Okla. 582, 250 P.2d 842 (1952); Westcott v.
Bozarth, 202 Okla. 149, 211 P. 2d 258 (1949). See Professor Donley's com-
ment on this point. DoNLEY, op cit. supra note 3, § 29 at 31.
25 See Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278, 50 S.E. 236 (1905), where the
grantor "reserved" a mineral interest in a conveyance of land and the court
gave effect to it, although a mineral interest in West Virginia is viewed as a
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production to which the owner is entitled-a right to the pre-
scribed fraction of gross production as a royalty interest or a
right to the prescribed fraction of the royalty provided in the lease
as a mineral interest.2" Also, the classification of an interest as a
mineral interest, or as a non-executive interest is important in
determining the extent to which there will be a division of the
management and leasing powers.
When the granting clause of a deed uses appropriate language
to convey a mineral interest, and then proceeds to strip from that
interest one or more of its usual incidents of ownership, a difficult
construction problem is presented."
THE NON-PARTICIPATING MINERAL INTEREST
One of the more frequently encountered mineral conveyances,
in recent years, has been the transfer of a non-participating mineral
interest. 8 The interest is granted as an undivided fractional interest
in the minerals in place, but the grantor reserves to himself, his
heirs and assigns, the exclusive right to execute oil and gas leases. 9
By virtue of the ownership of an interest in the oil and gas in
place, the owner of the non-participating mineral interest enjoys
all of the other incidents of ownership of a full mineral interest.30
It is generally held that the mere separation of the executive
right from the grantee's mineral interest does not change that
interest into a royalty interest.3' This holding is based upon the
26 1 Kurrz, op. cit. supra note 5, § 15.3.
27 Morris, op. cit. supra note 2, at 265.
28 Woodward, Sharing of Lease Benefits. B. A. SEC-nON OF Mn, maL &
NATunAP IBEsourcEs LAw (1961). "Because the right to receive bonuses and
rentals is normally associated with the right to lease, problems of construction
may arise when an instrument is not clear as to whether or not it was
intended to grant the power to lease when the right to receive rentals
and bonuses was granted.... The problem should be one of construction of
instruments .. " 1 KuN'Nz, op cit. supra note 5, § 15.7.
29 2 Wn&LL I & MEYEms, op. cit. supra note 5, § 502 at 193. Of course
both the non-participating mineral interest and the royalty interest can be
created by reservation and exception, whereby the executive right and the
mineral interest would pass to the grantee. Morris op. cit. supra note 2.
10 Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So. 2d 657 (1954); Simpson
v. Burris, 365 P.2d 134, 137 (Okla. 1961); McNeil v. Shaw, 295 P.2d 276
(Okla. 1956).
31 Alfrey v. Ellington, 285 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Morris,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 275. Because the owner of the non-participating
mineral interest has no right to lease, it follows that he has no right of
ingress or egress, nor does he have the right to develop the minerals himself.
It is the absence of these rights which distinguish this interest from a mineral
interest. Williams & Meyers, Impact of Pooling & Unitization on Term Interests
in Oil & Gas, 11 Sw. L.J. 399, 401 (1957).
19641
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fact that the non-executive, although having no right to lease or
to develop the property, has the right to his share of the bonuses,
delay rentals, and royalties, a right not given to an owner of a pure
royalty interest.32
The West Virginia court has never specifically dealt with a
conveyance involving a non-participating mineral interest.
THE ROYALTY INTEREST
Another frequently encountered mineral conveyance is the transfer
of a royalty interest. The Indiana definition of royalty as a share
of the product or profit reserved by the owner for permitting an-
other to use his property33 is considered to be an example of the
common law and majority definition. 4 Williams and Meyers define
royalty as a right to a share of the gross production from the land
or of the proceeds from the sale of such production free of the
costs of drilling, equipping, and operating the well. 5 Merrill,
following these same lines, maintains that the royalty owner's
"sole right" is to share in the royalties to the extent of his interest. 6
The incidents of the royalty interest may be described in a
positive fashion. The owner of such an interest is entitled to a
prescribed fraction of the oil and gas produced and saved, free of
costs, and he is entitled to the utmost fair dealing in the exercise
of the leasing power by the owner of that right.3" The royalty
owner, however, enjoys no right of access for the purpose of
utilizing the oil and gas. 8 Consequently, the owner of such an
interest cannot give a valid oil and gas lease, nor is it necessary
for him to join in the execution of the lease. 9 Professor Donley
11 Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith, 218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 834
(1953); 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 202.3. See generally
Morris, op. cit. supra note 2, at 294.
33 Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Stewart, 45 Ind. App. 544, 90 N.E.
384 (1910).34 Federal Land Bank v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 788, 144 Ct. Cl.
173 (1958).
3-'2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 502-505.3 6 MERyILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL & GAS LEASES § 191C (2d ed.
1959).3 7 Voyta v. Clonts, 134 Mont. 156, 328 P.2d 655 (1958).
38 Homer v. Gas Co., 71 W. Va. 345, 76 S.E. 662 (1912); Lathrop v.
Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136 (1951). "It is the rule that what
appears to be a royalty interest will be converted into a mineral interest if the
owner is expressly given the right of ingress and egress for the purpose of
development." Morris, op. cit. supra note 2, at 302.39 Davis v. Mann, 234 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1956); Pease v. Dolezal, 206
Okla. 696, 246 P.2d 757 (1952); 1 KuN-z, op cit. supra note 5, § 15.2.
[Vol. 66
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states that "... royalty . . . brought to the surface is personal
property ... 4o
The royalty interest is usually created by grant, reservation, or
exception, as is a mineral interest. The grant or reservation of a
royalty interest is usually in language that refers to participation in
production rather than to ownership of the oil and gas in place, or,
in language that shears the recipient of the executive powers and
the right to participate in the other leasing and development bene-
fits.4' The royalty interest may be created either prior to or sub-
sequent to a lease of the land for oil and gas purposes."2 The
mineral estate has all the rights, powers, privileges, and immuni-
ties after the transfer of a royalty interest that it had before,
except one-the right to receive all the royalty on the production
from the land.43 The executive right remains in the grantor" as




In the majority of the oil-producing states a mineral interest-
whether an undivided interest or the whole mineral fee-carries with
it all the incidents of ownership possible in a mineral estate; a
non-participating mineral interest has all of such incidents of owner-
ship, save the right to join in the execution of a lease. 46 It should
be borne in mind that the owner of a royalty interest has no
present or prospective possessory interest in the land; that he
owns no part of the minerals, as such, in place; that he does not
become a cotenant in the mineral estate; and that his interest
is merely a present, vested incorporeal interest in the land carrying
with it only a right to the stated proportion of the gross production.
47
40 DONLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 26.
41 Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946);
Rich V. Donaghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac 86 (1918); 1 WLLiAms & MEERs,
op. cit. supra note 8, 202.3. "The retention of such rights as . . . the
right to lease for oil and gas are incompatible with the reservation of a pure
royalty interest." Pease v. Dolezal, supra note 39.4
1 Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945); Jones,
Problems Presented by the Separation of the Exclusive Leasing Power from
Ownership of Land, Minerals, or Royalty, SoumnwF-smER LE:GAL FOUNDATION
2 D INsTrruTE ON On. & GAS LAW & TAXATION 271 (1951); DoNLEY, op cit.
supra note 3, § 163.
43 O'Daniel v. Roth, 320 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
4See 1 WmLmrs & MEYFms, op cit. supra note 8, § 208.
45 Stone v. Texoma Prod. Co., 336 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Okla. 1959).
46 See Pease v. Dolezal, supra note 39; Law v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,
209 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).4 7 Clampitt v. Ponder, 91 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. Ark. 1950); La Laguna
Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal. App. 2d 132, 114 P.2d 351 (1941); Arnold v.
19641
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As was mentioned earlier, prior to the decision in the Davis case
the West Virginia court had refused to uphold the validity of a
pure royalty interest.48 Basically, the conveyances the court was
faced with in the Davis case were these: 0, the owner of the land
in fee, devised the tract to his four sons, A, B, C, and D. A con-
veyed his one-fourth undivided interest to D, which gave D an un-
divided one-half interest in the land and minerals. B and C con-
veyed their interests to D, but each reserved one-fourth of the oil
and gas royalty, when produced. As a result of these conveyances,
D owned the tract in question subject only to the one-half royalty
interest retained by his two brothers. D sold the tract to E, reserv-
ing a one-half royalty interest for himself, his heirs and assigns.49
E's successor in interest leased the land to X; B, C, and D's suc-
cessors in interest leased the land to Z. The question presented to
the court was whether E's successor or the successors of B, C, and D
had the right to lease the land. In order to determine the rights of
the parties, it was necessary for the court to determine the nature
of the reservations made by B, C, and D." The court held that
the reservations were pure royalty interests and thus the tract
could be leased only by E's successor in interest.
The reservations in the deeds were reservations of the profits
to be derived from the production of oil and gas, and an application
of the rule as stated in Toothman v. Courtney5' would require a
mineral rather than a royalty construction. The court, however,
stated that the legal principle on which the holding in the Toothman
case was based was ". . . merely a rule of construction which
Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). In Jackson v.
Dulaney, 37 W. Va. 309, 67 S.E. 795 (1910), title to the "oil in place" was
reserved and the grantee given the right to lease and develop the minerals.
This is normally sufficient to establish a non-participating mineral interest, but
the grantor was given only the right to receive one-tenth of the gross produc-
tion as a royalty interest rather than a right to the prescribed fraction of the
royalty provided by a lease as a mineral interest. This is an indication of
the confusion in West Virginia prior to the Davis decision.
41 Note 6 supra and accompanying text. The West Virginia court had,
however, adopted the Indiana definition of royalty, although it failed to follow
the definition. Robinson v. Milam, supra note 13.49 Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 78 (W. Va. 1963).
0 The determination needed was "whether the right to lease is in the
owner of the fee, subject to certain reservations of oil and gas rights; or
whether the right to lease is in the persons owning the rights thus reserved."
ibid.
5 62 W. Va. 167, 58 S.E. 915 (1907). The court in this case held that
a grant or reservation of the royalties to be derived from the land is, in effect,
a grant or reservation of title to the mineral. Id at 175, 58 S.E. at 918. See
Coke's rule, supra note 7.
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cannot control or override an intention to the contrary expressed
in the language of the . . . writing under consideration."5 In
Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., the court had held that a grant
of the rents and royalties resulting from the production of oil was
a ". . . grant of the oil in such land. ' 53 In the present case, how-
ever, the court stated that the rule set forth in the Paxton case
has no application ". . . if it appears that the intention of the
parties is clearly expressed in the language which created the oil
and gas reservations now under consideration."54 The court then
stated that a royalty interest and a mineral interest each have sep-
arate, distinguishing incidents of ownership, and a deed will be
construed as establishing either a royalty or a mineral interest
depending on which of these incidents are granted or reserved.55
It is submitted that Coke's rule has lost its importance and sig-
nificance, even as a rule of construction, by the court's pointing out
the distinction between the incidents of ownership in a mineral
interest and those of a royalty interest. The grant or reservation
of a mineral interest or a royalty interest is dependent, now, on
the particular incidents of ownership conveyed or withheld rather
than on the application of a common law dictum.
The apparent emphasis placed by the court on the words "when
produced" should not be interpreted as requiring the use of such
words to create a royalty interest. This apparent requirement was
negated by the court's statement that a ". . . construction which
places in the grantees the ownership of the oil and gas in place,
subject to mere royalty rights, renders all of the language of the
reservations meaningful and purposeful."56  The court was ob-
viously following the rule of giving effect, if possible, to every
word used in the instrument" rather than attempting to require
the use of the words "when produced" to create a royalty interest.
Briefly stated, the effect of the Davis case is to construe an in-
strument as reserving a pure royalty interest, and not as a reserva-
tion of the minerals in place-a construction which would have
been required by an application of Coke's rule and the series of
cases beginning with Toothman v. Courtney.8
52 Davis v. Hardman, supra note 49, at 80.
s'80 W. Va. 187, 94 S.E. 472 (1917)54 Davis v. Hardman, supra note 49, at 81.5 5 Id. at 81.56 Id. at 82.
5 7 DoN.xY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 65 at 84.
5' Note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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THE EXECUTIVE RIGHT
If the reservations involved in the Davis case had been construed
as reservations of the oil and gas in place, instead of royalty in-
terests, the court would have been faced with the problem of
determining the validity of the executive right given to E and his
successor in interest. Recognition of this right is essential if there
is to be a full and complete utilization of the oil and gas estate. 9
Unfortunately, the court in the Davis case failed to clarify the
confusion in West Virginia with regard to the effect and validity of
the executive right.
The West Virginia court by upholding the validity of a non-
executive interest, in order to remain consistent must also recognize
the validity of the executive right, for it is illogical to imply the right
when a royalty interest is outstanding and then to refuse to recog-
nize it when a non-participating mineral interest is outstanding."0
Professor Donley has stated that to invalidate the executive right
is inexplicable; ". . . it results in the defeat of a perfectly legiti-
mate business transaction; and it permits the promisor to break
his promise with impunity."'"
Various efforts have been made to identify the executive right
with conventional property concepts. The right has been classified
as a power of appointment;62 as a power coupled with an interest: 3
and as a common law power of exchange-which exists in some
states as a power in trust." Despite the different views taken by
the courts and the writers in sustaining the executive right, the
majority agree that it cannot be sustained on the theory of a power
coupled with an interest.65 The problems inherent in an attempt
"' See generally Morris, Some Legal Consequences Resulting from a
Separation of the Incidents of Ownership of a Mineral Interest, 7 OKLA. L. REv
285 (1954).
60 Everett, op. cit. supra note 2, at 519.
61 DoNLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 138 at 183.
62 Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal.App.2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (1941).
63 Bonzo v. Nowlin, 285 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1955); See also Drake v.
O'Brien, 99 W. Va. 582, 130 S.E. 276 (1925).
64 See generally Kuntz, Rule Against Perpetuities & Mineral Interests, 8
OxLA. L. REv. 183 (1955).
65 "The difficulty with this theory is that the grantor has no interest
in the undivided mineral fee interest of his grantee over which he has at-
tempted to reserve this power." Gilmer v. Veatch, 121 S.W. 545 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1909). The West Virginia court in Drake v. O'Brien, supra note 63,
attempted to uphold an executive right on the theory of a power coupled with
an interest. Two later cases, from other jurisdictions, considered the executive
right and held it valid despite the contention that it was a power not coupled
with an interest. Kilfayle v. Wright, 300 F.2d 626 (Cir. 1962); Dat v.
Breitung, 136 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 1963); See generally Kuntz, supra note 64.
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at classification are avoided if the right is recognized as a distinct
and separately alienable incident of mineral ownership-whether
or not it has an exact counterpart in feudal land law.66 It has
been considered consistent in theory to recognize the validity of
the right as a separate and distinct property right which is alien-
able as one of the incidents of ownership of an undivided mineral
interest.67
If the exclusive power to lease the minerals of another is upheld
as a separate property right the question is presented as to
whether or not it may be created as a naked right, independent
of ownership of any other associated interest in the minerals. If
the right is to be treated as a separately alienable interest of
mineral ownership, it is capable of being created as a naked
power. It should be a matter of construction to determine whether
it was intended that the right be in gross, as a naked right, or be
appurtenant to an undivided part of the full mineral interest.
If the right is in gross it should pass with a conveyance of the
mineral interest which the holder of the right possessed at the
time of "creation,"68 unless it is expressly excluded from the grant.
The confusion in West Virginia with regard to the executive right
is illustrated by the case of Rawling v. Fisher.69 In that case a
grant containing a reservation of one-half of the minerals, the
executive right and the right to receive rentals expressly vested
in the grantee, was construed as a personal covenant, unenforce-
able by a successor in title of the grantee against the grantor.
Thus, it was held, that the grantor could lease his one-half interest
and collect the rentals therefrom."0 The court's error in char-
66 1 KuNTz, op. cit supra note 5. § 15.7.
67 Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672
(1957); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Gain, 355 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962), (dissenting opinion); Martin v. Snuggs, 302 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957).
68 Bums v. Audas, 312 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); 1 KuNT-z, Om.
& GAS § 15.7 at 349. Contra, 2 WnLAzMs & MEYERS, Or. & GAS LAW § 502
at 193 (1959), the right is in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament.
69 101 W. Va. 253, 132 S.E. 489 (1926).
7 0 
It would seem that in all jurisdictions, if a mineral interest is stripped
of all its incidents of ownership, except royalty, the courts would hold the
grant or reservation to be one of royalty only. Morris, Mineral Interest or
Royalty Interest? SouTwEsTmEN LEGAL FOUNDATION 10TH O1 & GAS LAW
& TAXATION 259, 298 (1959). Since the mineral reservation here was stripped
of all the incidents except royalty, the court was wrong in not characterizing
that interest as a royalty interest. Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith, "218
Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 834 (1953).
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acterizing interests in oil and gas as covenants was compounded
by the conclusion that the executive right, as a covenant, did not
touch and concern the land, and thus there was no privity of estate;
hence the grantor was not bound by the provisions in his deed.
"Fortunately this contribution to the learning on oil and gas has
not received wide circulation."7' Given the fact that the owner of
a mineral interest may sever, as separate property rights, the inci-
dents of ownership inherent in that interest"2 and that the executive
right is inherent in the ownership of the oil and gas in place,"'
it is impossible to justify the court's holding that the subsequent
grantee's interest was unenforceable because it was a personal
covenant. No mention was made of the Rawling case in the Davis
decision.
If the executive right could be considered a covenant, it could
only be a covenant which runs with the land. A covenant running
with the land has been defined as an incident of the land, the
benefit or burden of which passes to subsequent owners. It is
created initially by the grantor and grantee having privity of estate
at the time of the conveyance under which a grantor or grantee
agrees to do or not to do something on the land conveyed so that
a subsequent grantee of either is bound by the covenant.7 4 West
Virginia has held that for a covenant to run with the land it must
respect the thing granted, and concern the estate conveyed. 5
Because the executive right is an inherent portion of the owner-
ship of a mineral interest, it must necessarily touch and concern
an estate granted in the minerals, and therefore, as a covenant
must run with the land.76 According to Thompson's definition,
the incident of the land which passes to a subsequent grantee is
created initially by a prior grantor and grantee.77 The executive
right cannot be created initially by a covenant between a grantor
and grantee for the right is already in existence as an inherent part
of the ownership of a mineral interest. A grant or reservation of the
executive right is not a covenant running with the land or otherwise.
7 1
, 1 WmUA MS & MEYMS, OM & GAs LAw § 304.9 (1959).
72 Note 16 supra and accompanying text.
71 See Davis v. Hardman, supra note 49, at 81; Note 15 supra and ac-
companying text.
747 THOMPSON, R-AL Psor,,Yr § 3688 (perm ed. 1941).
' Tennant v. Tennant, 69 W. Va. 28, 70 S.E. 851 (1911); See generally
DoN.uY, CoAL, OI. & GAs IN WEST VmG]NIA & VmGMnA § 138 (1951).76 DoNrEY, op. cit. supra note 75, § 138 at 183.
77 Note 74 supra and accompanying text.71 Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Cain, supra note 67, at 510.
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In the instance where the executive right is severed from an
undivided part of the full mineral interest, and a non-participating
mineral interest created, the validity of such a right is recognized
to the same extent as it is in regard to a royalty interest.79 For
example in Superior Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.," a Texas
court was called upon to decide the validity and legal effect of an
attempt by the grantor to pass to the grantee the perpetual power
to execute oil and gas leases on the undivided one-half mineral
interest retained by the grantor in the deed to the grantee coveying
the surface and the other one-half mineral interest-the identical
factual situation existing in the Rawling case. The court held that
neither the grantor nor his assigns could thereafter lease the retained
interest; that the grantee had the exclusive right and power to
lease the land; and that the power was irrevocable. Conversely,
on the conveyance of a non-participating mineral interest, the
grantor may reserve to himself, his heirs and assigns, the exclusive
right to lease the conveyed interest, and a lease executed by his
successors in interest is valid.8" The executive right is a vested
right which may pass by inheritance or by assignment. 2 The grant
or reservation of the executive right may, of course, be in such
terms that it is construed as a non-assignable right purely personal
to the grantor or grantee, which necessarily terminates on the death
of the holder of the power.8"
Many competent oil attorneys have been constantly plagued by
the fear that the courts might hold any attempt to place in the
hands of one cotenant the perpetual and exclusive power to lease
the entire mineral fee estate invalid as a violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities or of the rule against restraints on alienation, or both.
The vast majority of cases involving the executive right ignore these
issues and recognize the validity of the transaction. 4
It has been pointed out that recognition of the executive right
increases the alienability of the interests subject thereto, and also
79 1 KuNTz, op. cit. supra note 68, § 15.7.
8 239 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
81 De Busk v. Cosden Petroleum Corp., 262 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ App.
1953).82 Stone v. Texoma Prod. Co., supra note 45; Cockrell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., supra note 67.
83 Sullivan, Executive Power to Lease. B. A. SECTION OF MINEAL &
NATuRAL BEsourcEs LAw (1962).
84 Jones, Separation of Exclusive Leasing Power from Ownership of
Land, Minerals or Royalty, SourrwEs-mnN LEGAL FouNDATIoN 2D INsTrTUTx
ON OIL & GAS LAWV & TAXATION 271 (1951); Note, Exclusive Power to Lease,
34 Tul. L. Rev 375 (1959).
19641
15
McCoy: Mineral Interests and the Executive Right in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1964
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
of the right itself. It is ridiculous therefore, to maintain that a grant
or reservation of the executive right violates the rule against
restraints on alienation. Furthermore, the Rule Against Perpetuities,
by preventing the remoteness of vesting, is designed to render land
more marketable. It is a travesty-in the name of the Rule-to
defeat this objective by invalidating a non-executive mineral interest
or the executive right."5
It seems clear that the courts will not leave the mineral or
royalty owner completely at the mercy of the owner of the executive
right. 6 It is obvious therefore, that certain duties should be imposed
upon the holder of the exclusive leasing power in the exercise of
that right."7 The proprietor of the executive right clearly owes a duty
to protect the concerns of such an interest. 8 The very nature of the
royalty and nonexecutive mineral interests contemplates develop-
ment, for it is only by development that the holder of the interest
may benefit. This being true, it is reasonable to assume, even
though the particular conveyance is silient, that the law will impose
a duty upon the person holding the sole right to develop or cause
development to use all reasonable means at hand to bring about the
exploitation of the underlying minerals. 9
In all jurisdictions having decisions on the subject,9" with the
possible exception of Louisiana," it has been held or assumed that
the holder of the executive right owes a duty to the owners of the
interests subject to such a power. Some of the cases indicate that
the fiduciary standard of conduct will be required of the holder
8- "No interest in property is valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than 21 years after a life in being at the time of the creation of the interest."
GnAy, RuE AGAINST PERPETUmES, § 201 (4th ed. 1942). 2 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 68. Walker maintains that the executive right vill
not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities or the rule against restraint on
alienation if the right can be defeated by partition. Walker, Developments in
the Law of Oil & Gas in Texas During the War Years - A Resume, 25 TEXAS
L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1946). A later decision held the executive right could not be
defeated by partition. Hudgins v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 192
(E.D. Tex. 1956).8 6 Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 569, 571 (1948).
87 1 KUNTZ, op. cit. supra note 68, § 15.7; See generally 2 WmIuus &
MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 68, 339.
88 Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W.
290 (1923); See Allison v. Smith, 278 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).8 9 Turpin, Mineral Deeds & Royalty Transfers, SouwEsTENm LEGAL
FOUNDATION 1ST INSTrUrE ON Om & GAs LAw & TAXATION 221, 235 (1949).90 E.g., Federal Land Bank v. United States, supra note 34; Lamp v.
Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S.E. 899 (1921).91 See Spiner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 94 F. Supp. 273 (W.D.La. 1950).
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of the executive right;9" others seem to impose only the duty to act
with prudence and good faith-the "utmost good faith."93 Pro-
fessor Merrill has stated the general rule concerning the executive's
duty of care: "If the holder of the executive right uses reasonable
diligence to secure the best terms for the common good, the bene-
ficiary has no legal ground of complaint."94
The remedies available to the owner of a non-participating interest
who has reason to complain have not yet been fully developed.
It has been held, however, that the non-executive can require the
executive to exercise some degree of good faith, either in leasing or
in refusing to lease.95 In a particular instance, therefore, if there
has been an intentional violation of duty, cancellation of the lease
may be proper. Monetary damages should be available, depending on
the facts, either as the sole remedy, as an alternative to cancellation
of the lease, or in conjunction with a cancellation of the lease. In
addition to the duty of executing a lease in a timely manner, it has
been held that the holder of the executive right must contract for
no less than the customary one-eighth royalty. 6
In summary, it may be said that the general custom or usage
of employing the executive right in oil and gas transactions has
received ". . . a sufficient sanction from the law so that its rejection
would unsettle property rights or cause some other adverse conse-
quence, especially in the petroleum industry where the executive
right prevades the entire business."9" The fact that the West Virginia
court, in the Davis case, recognized the executive right as a separate
attribute of ownership98 and that a reservation of such a right was
incompatible with a reservation of a pure royalty interest99 seems to
indicate that the errors of the Rawling case will not be repeated. The
holder of the executive right, whether in gross or appurtenant to
an interest in the minerals, should be held to have the right to pass to
a lessee the possessory right incident to a mineral estate for the pur-
pose of obtaining exploration for the development of the oil and gas,
resulting in benefit both to the executive and to the non-executive.
92 E.g., Wright v. Brush, 115 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1940).
93 E.g., Warren v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 211 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948).94 
MEMML, op. cit. supra note 36, § 191C.
9- McCall v. Nettles, 251 Ala. 349, 37 So. 2d 635 (1948).
96 Odstrcil v. McGlaun, 250 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).9 7 Everett, Executive Right to Lease, 3 RocKv MoumnTr MmmiAL L.
INSTITUT 509, 518 (1957).
9 Davis v. Hardhman, supra note 49, at 81.
99 Id at 82; accord, authorities cited note 41 supra.
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The executive right, the royalty interests, and the non-participating
mineral interest each were established in order to provide for easier
alienation and development. Unfortunately, recognition of the
validity of these interests will not provide the ultimate answer to
the complete utilization of the minerals. The purpose of the
executive right is to avoid frustrating the exploitation of the minerals
because of the practical difficulty of locating and securing oil and
gas leases from a number of people-a situation which occurs when
the full mineral interest has been divided into many undivided
interests, each with full incidents of ownership. ' Inasmuch as
this right is treated as a separately alienable interest in mineral owner-
ship-a separate property right-it must be considered divisible.
To allow a division of the executive right would defeat the purpose
for which it is used, and could result in a failure to develop the
oil and gas underlying the particular tract.
It is submitted that a more complete development of the oil
and gas will be accomplished if legislation is enacted abolishing
the common law rules of waste as these rules apply to the exploita-
tion of the oil and gas. The majority rule, allowing a cotenant in the
mineral fee to enter and explore for the oil and gas without the
consent of his cotenants, should be adopted.'0 ' If the legislature
refuses to abolish the rules of waste, it is submitted that, as an
alternative, legislation similar to the Texas Relinquishment Act be
enacted.' 2 The Act does not release or relinquish title to any part
of the oil and gas in place to the owner of the soil but merely con-
10 1 KuNm, op. cit. supra note 68, § 15.7 at 349.
101 TEx. Crv. STAT. ch. 38. §§ 5367-79 (1961). See generally 2 AM. L.
oF MHNING §§ 12.1 - 12.17 (1963). As to the lands which are subject to the
Relinquishment Act:
"The Relin uishment Act applies to all public free school lands or asylum
lands sold by rhe state . . . with either a mineral classification or mineral
reservation and it is immaterial whether the land has been patented or is
merely held under a purchase contract, and it is immaterial whether the
original sale made between 1895 and 1931 was forfeited and the land repur-
chased under the terms of the Relief Act. The only exception to this
seems to be a small amount of land that may have been classified and sold as
mineral land under the special provision of the Mineral Act of 1895." Walker,
Texas Relinquishment Act, SouTrwxsmiIN LEGAL FOUNDATION 1ST INSTriUTr,
ON Or. & GAs LAW & TAXATION 245, 255 (1949).
02 "Section Two of the act (§ 5368), since the decision in Greene v.
Robinson, 117 Tex. 516, 8 S.W.2d 655 (1928), is clear that the owner of the
soil does not have title to any part of the oil and gas in place and does not have
any power ... over these minerals other than by a sale of an oil and gas
leasehold in them as agent of the state." Walker, op. cit. supra note 101, at 265;
Jones, Separation of the Exclusive leasing Power from Ownership of Land,
Minerals or Royalty, SounwEs~rTEN LEGAL FOUNDATION 2D INSTITTE ON OIL
& GAs LAW & TAXATION 271 (1951).
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stitutes him the agent of the state for the purposes of leasing the
land for oil and gas development."0 3 If such legislation should be
enacted in West Virginia, the owner of the surface would be agent for
the owner of the mineral interest for the sole purpose of leasing
the oil and gas. Of course, the mineral owner should have the right
to terminate this agency at any time, on notice to the surface
owner.'04 Provision should also be made for a division of bonuses,
and it should be provided that any income from royalty established
by the lease be deposited in a bank-in an escrow account for in-
stance-in the county from whence the royalty minerals were pro-
duced. The benefits of such legislation are obvious: It would enable
an operator to secure a lease without the necessity of tracing the
mineral titles, it would remove the restrictions placed on develop-
ment by the common law rules of waste, and it would make it in-
cumbent on those claiming an interest in the proceeds from the
production to prove their title. Legislation, similar to that outlined
above, is necessary if West Virginia is to obtain the greatest benefit
from its petroleum and natural gas reserves.
Thomas Franklin McCoy
103 The right to terminate the agency at will should operate so as to pre-
vent a mineral owner from being deprived of his property without due process
of law, thus keeping the legislation within constitutional limits.
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